Thinking After Ricoeur by Davidson, Scott
Journal of  French Philosophy
Volume 16, Numbers 1 and 2, Spring-Fall 2006
Thinking After Ricoeur
Scott Davidson
Through his teaching and scholarship, Paul Ricoeur’s influence spans
virtually every aspect of  French philosophy in the latter half  of  the
20th century. As is well known, Ricoeur is the author of  over 30 books
and 500 articles, many of  which have been or will be translated into
English.1 Ricoeur’s career as an author began shortly after World War
II, with two books on the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1947)
along with an important translation and commentary on Husserl’s Ideas
I (1950). Shortly thereafter, Ricoeur published a series of  studies on
the human will, including Freedom and Nature (1950), Fallible Man (1965),
and The Symbolism of  Evil (1967).  Although he never completed the
final leg of  the project which was supposed to conclude with a “poetics
of  the will,” his important realization of  the surplus of  meaning in
symbols at the end of this project necessitated what might be described
as a “hermeneutic” turn. For the next twenty years, the interpretation
of  action, language, and texts thus became the focal point of  his interest.
Some of  Ricoeur’s important works in this period of  his thought include
The Conflict of  Interpretations (1969), The Rule of  Metaphor (1975), the three
volume work Time and Narrative (1983-1985), along with numerous
journal articles addressing the polysemy of  language, the theory of  the
text, and the interpretive task of  hermeneutics. After the publication
of  what some consider to be his masterpiece - Oneself  as Another (1990)
- Ricoeur increasingly added an ethical and political dimension to his
previous interest in the theory of  action. Ethics and politics are the
focus of  many of  Ricoeur’s later works, including The Just (1995),
Reflections on the Just (2001), Memory, History, Forgetting (2000), and The
Course of  Recognition (2004).  On the whole, Ricoeur’s work is most
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often praised for its historical rigor and intellectual clarity.  These traits
ultimately derive, I suspect, from his lifelong commitment to teaching,
such that Ricoeur’s role as an author might be understood as an
extension of  his role as a teacher.
It is Ricoeur’s influence as a teacher, which is perhaps less well
known, even though it is of  at least equal importance to his scholarship,
that I want to highlight here. In France, Ricoeur held teaching positions
at the University of  Strasbourg (1948-1956), the Sorbonne (1956-1967),
Nanterre (1967-1970), Louvain (1971-1973), and the University of  Paris
X (1973-1980). Over that span of  time, Ricoeur directed more doctoral
theses than any other French philosopher and thus served as the teacher
of  many philosophy teachers working in France (and abroad) today.
Yet, his influence was not limited to French intellectual circles. In thought
and deed, he engaged actively with the global issues of  his time, whether
it was in speaking in support for Algerian independence, in assisting
dissident scholars from the Eastern Bloc, or in joining in dialogue with
different religious traditions at Enrico Castelli’s famous colloquia in
Italy, to mention only a few examples. In addition to being an invited
speaker at universities across Europe and North America, Ricoeur taught
part of  the year in the United States at the University of  Chicago,
beginning in 1970, where he held the John Nuveen Professor chair in
the Divinity School, the Department of  Philosophy, and the Committee
on Social Thought.
To characterize the general spirit of  Ricoeur’s teaching and
scholarship, one might begin with the observation that the central task
of  his philosophy is that of  mediation. A philosophy of  mediation, on
Ricoeur’s view, has the task of  adjudicating between opposing views,
each of  which believes itself  to possess the whole truth.  For a
philosophy of  mediation, then, the truth is like the proverbial doorway,
described in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which no one fits perfectly but which
everyone can enter.  That is to say that no single viewpoint possesses
the truth in its entirety, but each viewpoint may have something to
contribute to understanding a part of  the truth. A philosophy of
mediation thus must begin by setting the existing viewpoints (the endoxa),
which are all too often disengaged from one another, side by side. By
putting the opposed viewpoints into a productive dialogue, Ricoeur’s
philosophy of  mediation seeks to highlight the underlying questions
and concerns that they share in common, and in so doing, to gain
insight into valuable new connections, for example, between the
problems of  the ancients and those of  the moderns, between the natural
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sciences and the human sciences, and perhaps most tellingly, between
Analytic and Continental philosophy. One might worry that this task
of  mediation would limit Ricoeur’s philosophy to viewpoints which
have already been discovered and to ideas which have already been
understood. However, in addition to working to establish a common
ground, the adjudication carried out by a philosophy of  mediation also
has a critical edge. Through its critical evaluation of  competing claims,
this philosophy of  mediation can also be productive in the sense that it
can bring about new discoveries which none of  the viewpoints, taken
alone, could glimpse. Ricoeur’s philosophy of  mediation at once
recognizes the importance of  history and yet demands a creative and
critical engagement with history.  For this reason, Ricoeur’s philosophical
approach can be an especially good starting point either for an English-
speaking student who seeks to learn about the background texts and
concepts of  Continental thought or, as is less often appreciated but
equally valuable, for a Continental student who seeks an inroad to
Analytic thought.
When Ricoeur’s work is criticized, it is commonly faulted for
devoting too much time to presenting the views of  others and, as a
result, for having little originality of  its own. In assessing Ricoeur’s
legacy, then, the extent to which Ricoeur’s thought does or does not
offer an original philosophical contribution is an important question
to be considered. Admittedly, at its worst, Ricoeur’s work can be criticized
rightly for its lack of  originality, but this criticism may not be an accurate
characterization of  his work as a whole. Valuing the end-result over the
process, Ricoeur’s critics may point out that he devotes relatively few
of  the pages in his works to the presentation of  his own ideas.  But,
defenders of  Ricoeur might reply that this criticism confuses Ricoeur’s
modesty with unoriginality. Ricoeur’s modesty leads him to give credit
to the ideas of  others where it is due, to downplay the originality of  his
interpretations of  other thinkers, and to understate the significance of
his own conclusions. Ricoeur’s work thus places heavy demands on
the reader, because it requires not only a considerable degree of  patience
in order to work through the careful process of  mediation but also a
considerable degree of  rigor in order to draw out the full significance
of  its conclusions. For this reason, it is likely that an accurate assessment
of  Ricoeur’s originality will emerge only as a result of  continued
scholarship on Ricoeur’s work. The essays presented in this volume
take an important first step in this direction through their critical
examination of  Ricoeur’s influence across the disciplines, including
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the fields of  philosophy, theology, rhetoric, law, political theory, history,
psychology, technology, and the fine arts.
The essays collected in this volume were selected from papers
delivered at a conference in honor of  Ricoeur’s life and work. The
conference, “After Ricoeur,” was held at Oklahoma City University on
October 20-21, 2006. Over fifty participants were in attendance,
representing the United States, Canada, Ireland, Great Britain, and
Belgium. The conference participants were asked to assess the
significance of  Ricoeur’s contributions in their respective disciplines.
The conference led to the creation of  “The Society for Ricoeur Studies,”
whose aim will be to provide a forum for the continued advancement
of  scholarship on Ricoeur’s work across the disciplines.
Together, the essays collected here mark the development of
a new generation of  Ricoeur scholarship. While the preceding generation
of  Ricoeur scholars had the unenviable task of  keeping pace with
Ricoeur’s prolific rate of  publication and of  presenting these works to
the scholarly community, his works are now more widely translated
and known. Instead of  being called to introduce new works or to
overview Ricoeur’s philosophical development, this new generation
of  scholarship is now interested in examining the implications of
Ricoeur’s thought within a variety of  new, interdisciplinary contexts. In
this collection of  essays, one can also detect a general shift of  interest
away from Ricoeur’s middle period which focused on the polysemy of
language and the need for hermeneutics.  Instead, as the essays in this
volume suggest, it is increasingly Ricoeur’s early trilogy on the human
will along with his later works on politics and ethics that occupy the
interest of  Ricoeur scholars today.
Charles Reagan, a personal friend and confidant of  Ricoeur
for many years, conjoins a textual analysis of  The Course of  Recognition
with personal memoir. Quite movingly, Reagan describes the last days
of  Ricoeur’s life as well as the events surrounding his funeral. In his
analysis of  Ricoeur’s final completed work, The Course of  Recognition,
Reagan notes a subtle difference between Ricoeur’s previous works
and this one. Whereas his previous works typically concluded by pointing
in the direction of  a set of  unexplored problems to be taken up in a
future work, this work concludes perhaps with a glance back to the
past and the loss of  his wife Simone, when Ricoeur makes reference to
Montaigne’s expression of  the loss of  his friend La Boétie.  Montaigne
writes: “If  you press me to tell you why I loved him, I feel that it cannot
be expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was I.”
THINKING AFTER RICOEUR
5
Likewise, readers of  The Course of  Recognition might lament that this
book leaves many problems unresolved but for the first time these
problems will not be taken up by Ricoeur.
In “Paul Ricoeur and the Return of  Humanism,” William
Schweiker examines the resources of  Ricoeur’s thought for thinking
humanism today. Clearly, one of  the central themes running the course
of  Ricoeur’s oeuvre is his defense of  the irreducibility of  the human,
viz. the first-person perspective. In developing Ricoeur’s contribution
to humanism, Schweiker takes a cue from Ricoeur’s observation that
we are “human, only human,” contrasting this with Nietzsche’s claim
that we are “human, all too human” as well as calls for a superhuman
destiny which would be something more than human. Situated between
these two poles, Ricoeur’s humanism paves the way for an ethics which
is rooted in the love of  life but yet is not egocentric in its affirmation
of  life. Taking the love of  life as an ultimate source of  value, this
humanism would offer the resources to respect all forms of  human
(and possibly non-human) life.  Schweiker’s focus on the issue of
humanism and the irreducibility of  the human in Ricoeur’s thought
introduces a key theme in the papers that follow, each of  which focuses
on some aspect of  the dynamic interaction between the self, others,
and the world.
David Kaplan’s essay “Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of
Technology” takes up the question of  Ricoeur’s relevance for thinking
about the nature and role of  technology today. Kaplan notes that
Ricoeur himself  has surprisingly little to say about technology, and
when he does speak about technology his thinking is unoriginal and
relatively negative. Nonetheless, Kaplan suggests that Ricoeur’s work,
and in particular his hermeneutical approach, contains the resources
for a more rich and insightful way to understand the positive relation
between technology and society. This approach would emphasize the
hermeneutical relation maintained between technology and society.
Todd Mei, in “Form and Figure: Paul Ricoeur and the
Rehabilitation of  Work, examines Ricoeur’s understanding of  the role
that work plays in shaping the meaning and value of  human life. One
of  the centerpieces of  Ricoeur’s thought on the human being, from
the beginning through the end of  his career, is his definition of  the
human being as a capable being, an “I can.” That is to say a being who
can act, speak, recount, and impute an action to an agent. To understand
human nature thus requires, in part, an understanding of  the nature of
human action and work. Because Ricoeur understands work to be an
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essential ingredient in shaping self-understanding, Mei rightly situates
Ricoeur within a Marxian legacy which emphasizes the positive role of
work.  Work, on this view, does not just serve an instrumental value as
a means to an end, instead, like poetry, Mei reminds us that it has the
capacity to create new forms of  meaning for ourselves and our world.
The hermeneutical relation between the self  and the text is
the focus of  John Arthos’ essay “The Scholar and The Pub Crawler:
Revisiting the Debate between Ricoeur and Gadamer.” Both Ricoeur
and Gadamer are known for their important contributions to the
development of  hermeneutics, yet Arthos highlights one fundamental
difference between them, viz. their understanding of  the social function
of  hermeneutics. While for Gadamer the hermeneutic task serves the
cultivation of  each individual as an active and vital participant in public
life, Arthos claims that for Ricoeur the hermeneutic task becomes highly
specialized and scholarly. The textual explanation and exegesis, which
performs the mediating role between pre-and post-critical understanding
in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, is a methodology that is relegated to specially
trained scholars. For this reason, Arthos concludes that Ricoeur
compromises the humanist spirit of  Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
Tim Davidson, in “Ricoeur’s Phenomenology of  the Ego:  A
Clinical Emphasis,” highlights the value of  Ricoeur’s work for clinical
psychology. Countering the tendency to adopt the paradigm of  the
natural sciences in psychology, Ricoeur emphasizes the irreducibility
of  the ego, even if  only in the form of  a fragile or wounded cogito.  The
clinical significance of  this insistence on the ego, Davidson suggests, is
to remind clinicians that, behind every treatment of  a symptom or
behavior, there remains an encounter with another person. One can
truly appreciate this point in the context of  Davidson’s own clinical
work with war veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
The war veteran is a prime example of  Ricoeur’s wounded cogito, be it
on a psychological, a physical level, or both.  The war veteran is, of
course, a patient whose psychological wounds require treatment. Yet,
Davidson would call on clinicians to recognize that the war veteran is
more than a set of  symptoms to be treated with medication. This is
because, behind the clinical treatment, the war veteran still remains a
cogito whose healing must occur on a personal level through a
reconfiguration of  the self.
George Taylor’s essay on “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of
Imagination” draws from a set of  unpublished lectures that Ricoeur
delivered on the imagination at the University of  Chicago in the fall of
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1975.   For Ricoeur, the imagination is of  central importance for the
self, because it is not just one faculty of  thought among others but
pervades all modes and activities of  thought. Taylor suggests that these
lectures point, in particular, to the important role of  the productive
imagination. The productive imagination, on Ricoeur’s view, does not
create out of  nothing, instead it starts from our acquired concepts and
then produces through a reconfiguration of  them. This does not just
transform how we think; for Ricoeur the productive imagination has
an ontological significance which transforms reality. In its transformation
of  reality, the productive imagination, as Taylor rightly cautions, can be
the site of  both brilliant innovations as well as terrible distortions. This
duality of  the productive imagination is reflected in the contrast between
utopia and ideology.
In his essay “Towards a Monumental Phenomenology: Paul
Ricoeur and the Politics of  Memory,” James Ambury examines the
role of  monuments in creating a shared memory of  a common history.
Monuments, in their best function, take up the demand never to forget
important events in history and also call on the imagination by evoking
its future. They thus establish a public place in which society can
commemorate an important event in its past and express a shared
vision of  its future aspirations. In addition to being important sites for
building social memory and a shared vision of  the future, monuments
can also be distorted into serving an ideological function. This occurs
either when they distort a society’s past or future in order to serve
present interests.
The musicologist Roger Savage, in his essay “Is Music Mimetic?
Ricoeur and the Limits of  Narrative,” examines Ricoeur’s thought in
the context of  the question of  representation in music.  Music, as
Savage notes, would seem to be a key exception to Ricoeur’s defense in
Time and Narrative of  a concept of  narrated time. Music is clearly a
temporal form of  art, but it is not clear that it need either be
representational or governed by a plot structure. Yet, Savage cautions
against going too far in the opposite direction, as Schopenhauer, Wagner
and others do, where music would be an “absolute” language wholly
separated from any dependence on conceptual representation or
emplotment. Neither an outer representation nor an inner feeling,
Savage suggests that music should be understood to evoke a mood in
the phenomenological sense, that is, an attunement directed toward
the world or others. It is here that Ricoeur’s work on narrative can
become instructive: music would provide an avenue for reconfiguring
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our attunement toward the world and others.
John Starkey, in his essay “Ricoeur and the Symbolic Roots of
Religious Experience,” examines Ricoeur’s philosophical convictions,
explicit and implicit, with respect to what can be said about the nature
of  religious experience Specifically, he argues that Ricoeur’s concern
with the “linguistic turn,” in his analysis of  language and literature,
ought not overshadow the insights into the nature of  religious
experience that can be culled from his earlier work. Regardless of
Ricoeur’s own religious convictions or their possible utility to particular
theologies, the symbolic roots of  religious experience straddle the line
between the nonlinguistic and the linguistic. Starkey thus calls on scholars
to return to Ricoeur’s earlier work in order to discover a rich account
of  non-linguistic and symbolic religious experience.
In “Systematic Theology after Ricoeur,” Dan Stiver highlights
the significance of  Ricoeur’s thought in the context of  systematic
theology. Stiver begins by noting that both systematic philosophy and
systematic theology have suffered a thoroughgoing crisis in the 20th
century, which can be attributed to the persistent attacks on their
founding methods and concepts by skepticism, relativism, and
irrationalism.  While Ricoeur’s work, on its surface, does not present
itself  as a systematic theology in the traditional sense, Stiver argues that
his hermeneutic method nonetheless offers valuable tools for
reconstructing a new, more modest, systematic theology in the wake
of  its 20th century collapse.  This form of  systematic theology would
no longer set out to provide a foundational basis for religious experience
but rather would seek a continual, interpretive elucidation of  it.
As a final note, thanks are due to the Petree College of  Arts
and Sciences and the Wimberly School of  Religion at Oklahoma City
University as well as to the Oklahoma Humanities Council for their
support of  the conference at which these essays were first presented.
Oklahoma City University
Notes
1Vansina, Frans D. Paul Ricœur: bibliographie primaire et secondaire =
primary and secondary bibliography, 1935-2000. Leuven: University Press, 2000. I
will refer to works by their English titles but date them in terms of  their
original French publication. English publication dates and further
bibliographical information can be found in Vansina.
